共识博弈与区块链生态共识均衡

doi:10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2024.03.001

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

本文的目的是建立刻画区块链生态系统行为表现的“共识博弈”的一般框架, 并针对“矿池间隔博弈”的“共识均衡”的存在性进行刻画和解读。特别是通过引进共识博弈这个新概念作为出发点, 尽管区块链平台生态本身会受到诸如挖矿间隔等行为的干扰, 我们证明了在合理的激励机制下一般区块链平台的共识博弈均衡点的存在性, 从正面的角度回答了区块链生态本身发展是否稳定这个非常基本和核心的问题。这里, “间隔博弈”(不良) 行为出现所在的区块链生态是指基于 Nakamoto 在 2008 年提出的遵循按照最长主链建设的“工作量证明”作为基本的共识原则的挖矿平台。特别地, 本文首先在一般激励机制条件下, 基于区块链生态中的共识博弈框架, 在有挖矿间隔等不良行为出现的情况下, 建立了在一般激励相容机制条件下的共识均衡点的存在性结果和对应区块链生态能够持续运转的稳定性解读; 然后结合在“挖(币) 矿”工作中涉及到的工作费用、奖励机制和挖矿能力这三类描述激励机制的核心要素, 从挖矿工(组) 收益的角度, 针对不同嵌入场景对挖矿工(组) 的“间隔博弈行为”可能产生的影响进行了解读和分析。本文的理论结果和案例分析表明, 结合不同挖矿场景相合适的激励相容机制, 共识博弈(均衡) 这个概念可以在理论的层面(即, 不需要情景数据模拟结果的支持), 能够得到或形成针对不同场景下的挖矿行为的解释和解读。此外, 我们有理由期待和相信, 结合影响挖矿(组) 收益相关的要素因子, 共识博弈可以帮助我们构建对应的合适场景的激励相容机制, 通过刻画挖矿工(组) 出现的诸如“间隔行为”, “分叉链”, “矿池攻击”等(不良) 行为, 支撑数字经济的健康发展, 并对共识经济学基础理论的发展能够起到推进作用。

关键词: 共识博弈, 共识均衡, 合作与非合作博弈, Nakamoto 共识, 工作量证明, 区块链生态, 区块链生态稳定性, 矿池博弈, 挖矿间隔博弈, 最长链规则, 区块链的分叉, 激励兼容性

Abstract:

The goal of thispaper is to establish a general framework for “Consensus Game” thatcharacterizes the behavior of blockchain ecosystems, and to addressbehaviors of the “Mining Pool Gap Game”, that is, we first give thecharacterizing and interpreting the behavior of “ConsensusEquilibria”, and establishing and explaining the stability of theblockchain platform itself with the positive answer based on theexistence of consensus equilibrium through the new concept called“consensus game” in the presence of mining gap (game) behavior, here, the blockchain ecosystem where “Gap Game” is located refersto a mining platform based on the consensus principle of “Proof ofWork” (PoW) with longest chain rules (LCR) proposed by Nakamoto in2008. Specifically, this paper first establishes the existence ofgeneral consensus equilibrium and the corresponding stabilityresults for continuous operation of the blockchain ecosystem undergeneral incentive mechanism conditions, based on the consensus gameframework in the blockchain ecosystem. Then, combined with the threemain factors involved in “mining Bitcoin” work, including workcosts, reward mechanisms, and mining capabilities, from theperspective of mining miner (group) profits, it interprets andanalyzes the potential impact of different embedding scenarios onthe “gap game behavior” of mining miners (groups). The theoreticalresults and case analysis of this article indicate that by combiningappropriate incentive compatibility mechanisms for different miningscenarios, the concept of consensus game (equilibrium) can obtain orform a consistent explanation and interpretation of mining behaviorin different scenarios without simulation results of scenario data.In addition, we have reason to expect and believe that consensusgames, combined with factors related to mining (group) profits, canhelp us build appropriate incentive compatibility mechanisms. Bycharacterizing behaviors such as “interval behavior”, “branchingchains”, and “mining pool attacks”, we can support the healthydevelopment of the digital economy and promote the development ofbasic theories of consensus economics.

Key words: consensus game, consensus equilibrium, cooperative and non-cooperative games, nakamoto consensus, proof of work, blockchain ecosystems, blockchain stability, mining pool gap game, longest chain rules (LCR), fork of blockchain, incentive compatibility

中图分类号:

O225

袁先智. 共识博弈与区块链生态共识均衡[J]. 运筹学学报（中英文）, 2024, 28(3): 1-26.

Xianzhi YUAN. Consensus game and consensus equilibrium in blockchain ecology[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2024, 28(3): 1-26.

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决策收益	矿工2挖主链	矿工2分叉
矿工1挖主链	3, 3	2, 5
矿工1分叉	5, 2	5, 5

决策收益	矿工2挖主链	矿工2分叉
矿工1挖主链	3, 3	2, -1
矿工1分叉	-1, 2	-1, -1

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