English

运筹学学报（中英文） ›› 2026, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (1): 93-107.doi: 10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2026.01.006

• • 上一篇    

基于“排队等待区域娱乐”的经济效益分析

孙珂1, 王金亭2, 王钟彬3,†   

  1. 1. 北京化工大学经济管理学院, 北京 100029;
    2. 中央财经大学管理科学与工程学院, 北京 100081;
    3. 天津大学管理与经济学部, 天津 300072
  • 收稿日期:2022-05-27 发布日期:2026-03-16
  • 通讯作者: 王钟彬 E-mail:zhongbin_wang@tju.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金 (Nos. 72322017, 72371259)

The economics of waiting-area entertainment

SUN Ke1, WANG Jinting2, WANG Zhongbin3,†   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Chemical Technology, Beijing 100029, China;
    2. School of Management Science and Engineering, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081, China;
    3. College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
  • Received:2022-05-27 Published:2026-03-16

PDF

5

摘要： 为缓解顾客在排队期间的等待焦虑, 许多服务商选择在等待区域“有偿”地提供娱乐服务。该措施能够有效降低顾客的等待成本, 使顾客“排队焦虑”的问题得到一定缓解。通过提供该措施, 不仅能够使更多顾客加入系统, 还可以为服务商带来额外的收入, 因此受到了商家的广泛青睐。本文基于当下服务行业“排队等待区域娱乐”的热门运营模式, 建立排队博弈模型, 从理论上分析了该运营模式对顾客均衡行为以及服务商收益的影响。本文主要得到以下几个结果: (1) 给出了顾客在队长信息可见与不可见两种情形下的纳什均衡策略(进队策略); (2) 揭露了服务商的最优信息披露策略, 即在市场规模较小(较大) 时, 隐藏(披露) 队长信息。发现服务商的最优“排队等待区域娱乐”价格应随着市场规模的提升而增加; (3) 尽管“排队等待区域娱乐”为消费者提供了额外的服务选项, 我们发现在市场需求较大时, 该项目的实施反而可能损害消费者的剩余价值。

关键词: 等待区域娱乐, 排队博弈, 信息披露, 服务商收益最大化, 顾客剩余

Abstract: In order to relieve customers' waiting anxiety when queueing, many service providers provide waiting-area entertainment (WAE) by charging a service fee. This measure can effectively reduce customers' waiting cost and the queueing anxiety of them has been also greatly alleviated. By providing this option, it can not only attract more customers to join the system, but also add additional revenue to service providers. So it is widely favored. This paper establishes a queueing game model by focusing on the popular operation mode of “waiting-area entertainment” in the current service industry, and analyzes the impact of this option on the equilibrium behavior of customers and the revenue of service providers theoretically. The following results are derived in this paper. First, the Nash equilibrium joining strategy of customers is explored under observable and unobservable information cases. Second, the revenue-maximizing information disclosure strategy is derived, and it is optimal to reveal (conceal) queue length information to customers when market size is large (small). The revenue-maximizing service fee increases with the market size. Third, although WAE is provided an additional service option for releasing customers' anxiety for waiting, we find that when the market size is large, this option may hurt consumer surplus.

Key words: waiting-area entertainment, queueing game, information disclosure, revenue maximization, consumer surplus

中图分类号: