博弈论视角的多属性逆向拍卖评标行为研究

运筹学学报 ›› 2012, Vol. 16 ›› Issue (4): 11-20.

博弈论视角的多属性逆向拍卖评标行为研究

刘旭旺¹ 汪定伟^1,2

1. 东北大学系统工程研究所 2. 流程工业综合自动化国家重点实验室

出版日期:2012-12-15 发布日期:2012-12-15
通讯作者: 刘旭旺 E-mail:liuxuwang007@163.com

Study of bid evaluation behaviors for multi-attribute reverse auction based on game theory

LIU Xuwang¹ WANG Dingwei^1,2

1. Institute of Systems Engineering, Northeastern University 2. State Key Laboratory of Synthetical Automation for Process Industries

Online:2012-12-15 Published:2012-12-15
Contact: LIU Xuwang E-mail:liuxuwang007@163.com
Supported by:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(Nos. 70931001, 61273203, 60821063)

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 技术属性和商务属性间强负相关性会诱导两组评标专家间的对立情绪和不合作行为，评标管理部门对评标专家的组织管理是评标公平性的重要因素. 以博弈论为工具分别建立了多属性逆向拍卖分组评标机制下技术专家和商务专家之间、管理部门与评标专家之间行为的理论模型和研究框架，分析了纯策略纳什均衡解存在的条件.然后，分析了影响技术与商务专家、管理部门与评标专家之间策略选择的因素，揭示了评标参数对均衡的影响. 为便于研究博弈主体行为，基于Matlab GUI平台开发了分组多属性逆向拍卖评标和管理行为仿真系统. 数值仿真了评标环境的改变和决策参数的不同对均衡结果的影响.

关键词: 多属性逆向拍卖, 行为运筹学, 分组多属性评标, 博弈论, 行为分析

Abstract: There is usually strong negative relevance between technical and business attributes in current bid evaluation process. It will induce the antagonistic feelings and non-cooperation behavior between two groups. Administrative department's organizational administration is a key factor to fairness. Based on game theory, models about bid evaluation behaviors are constructed to analyze the conditions how to achieve equilibrium, one is about technical and business experts and the other is about experts and administrative department, and which is the Pure Strategies Nash Equilibrium. Then, the influencing factors to relative behaviors are analyzed. At last, the simulation system about the game is developed and runs on the platform of Matlab GUI with adjusting relevant parameters.

Key words: multi-attribute reverse auction, behavior operation management, grouped bid evaluation, game theory, behavioral analysis

中图分类号:

F224

刘旭旺, 汪定伟. 博弈论视角的多属性逆向拍卖评标行为研究[J]. 运筹学学报, 2012, 16(4): 11-20.

LIU Xuwang, WANG Dingwei. Study of bid evaluation behaviors for multi-attribute reverse auction based on game theory[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2012, 16(4): 11-20.

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