拍卖机制设计在区块链中的应用与挑战

doi:10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2023.01.001

Abstract

Abstract:

Blockchain is an important part of the new generation of information technology. It is a new database software integrated with distributed network, encryption technology, smart contract and other technologies. Over the past decade, blockchain technology has had a wide impact on a global scale. Today's blockchain technology has shifted from its initial focus on the decentralization of cryptocurrency and payment to the decentralization of the market. The emergence of smart contract makes the decentralized finance (De-Fi) based on blockchain technology enter a state of rapid development, and various auction scenarios in the context of blockchain also emerge. From the perspective of mechanism design, this paper is the first to summarize and analyze the auction mechanisms on the blockchain in recent years by taking the transaction fee mechanism, NFT auction and MEV auction as the main objects. In addition, we also highlight the challenges and the open problems of the auction mechanism design, based on the characteristics of blockchain.

Key words: blockchain, auction, transaction fee, NFT, MEV, smart contract

CLC Number:

O225
TP3-05

Hongyin CHEN, Yukun CHENG, Xiaotie DENG, Zhanghao YAO. Auction in blockchain: Applications and challenges[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2023, 27(1): 1-29.

Figures/Tables 4

References 103

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Auction in blockchain: Applications and challenges

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