均分值、均分剩余值与差边际性

doi:10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2026.01.018

运筹学学报（中英文） ›› 2026, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (1): 247-255.doi: 10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2026.01.018

• • 上一篇

均分值、均分剩余值与差边际性

于志强¹, 崔泽光², 单而芳^1,†

1. 上海大学管理学院, 上海 200444;
2. 太原科技大学经济与管理学院, 山西太原 030024

收稿日期:2022-07-16 发布日期:2026-03-16
通讯作者: 单而芳 E-mail:efshan@shu.edu.cn
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金 (No. 72371151)

Equal division value, equal surplus division value, and differential marginality

YU Zhiqiang¹, CUI Zeguang², SHAN Erfang^1,†

1. School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China;
2. School of Economics and Management, Taiyuan University of Science and Technology, Taiyuan 030024, Shanxi, China

Received:2022-07-16 Published:2026-03-16

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 均分值和均分剩余值是平均主义思想下最具代表性的两种分配规则,且两者都满足经典的可加性和对称性。Casajus (2011) 引入差边际性公理,并详细阐述了该公理与可加性和对称性之间的联系。基于此,本文运用差边际性重新刻画了均分值和均分剩余值。本文同样介绍了均分值和均分剩余值的凸组合形式,并给出相应地公理化刻画。

关键词: 合作对策, 均分值, 均分剩余值, 差边际性

Abstract: For cooperative games with transferable utility, equal division value and equal surplus division value are two eminent solutions, and both of them satisfy two standard axioms, additivity and symmetry. To eliminate the controversial additivity, Casajus (2011) proposes differential marginality axiom and explores the relationship between this proposed axiom and both additivity and symmetry. Inspired by Casajus (2011), we employ differential marginality to characterize the equal division value, the equal surplus division value, and their convex combinations.

Key words: cooperative games, equal division value, equal surplus division value, differential marginality

中图分类号:

F224.32

于志强, 崔泽光, 单而芳. 均分值、均分剩余值与差边际性[J]. 运筹学学报（中英文）, 2026, 30(1): 247-255.

YU Zhiqiang, CUI Zeguang, SHAN Erfang. Equal division value, equal surplus division value, and differential marginality[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2026, 30(1): 247-255.

参考文献

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均分值、均分剩余值与差边际性

Equal division value, equal surplus division value, and differential marginality

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