企业内部的随机分权

运筹学学报 ›› 2012, Vol. 16 ›› Issue (4): 69-76.

企业内部的随机分权

翁翕¹李四光²

1. 北京大学光华管理学院 2. 北京大学经济学院

出版日期:2012-12-15 发布日期:2012-12-15
通讯作者: 翁翕 E-mail:wengxi125@gsm.pku.edu.cn

Random decentralization within multi-divisional organizations

WENG Xi¹ LI Siguang²

1. Guanghua School of Management, Peking University 2. School of Economics, Peking University

Online:2012-12-15 Published:2012-12-15
Contact: WENG Xi E-mail:wengxi125@gsm.pku.edu.cn

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在一个信息传递模型框架中考察多部门组织内部权力的随机配置. 研究结论表明，在特定参数范围内，随机分权能提升组织治理局部适应和部门协调的能力；而且，数值分析表明最优组织结构下的集权概率随着部门协调需求和部门经理层激励冲突的上升而增加. 因此，组织主动引入权力配置不确定性本身可能就是最优组织结构的组成部分，从而为随机分权提供了一种理论解读.

关键词: 局部适应, 部门协调, 集权, 分权, 随机分权

Abstract: This paper investigates random allocation of authority in a multidivisional organization in which decisions must be adapted to local conditions but also coordinated with each other. Our newly-proposed organizational structure introduces commitment to randomization of pure centralization and pure decentralization. Our result shows that random delegation indeed improves the organization's ability to govern adaptation and coordination in a strategic information transmission environment. Thus the optimal organizational structure may involve random decentralization and the organization may add uncertainty on the power structure on purpose.

Key words: adaptation, coordination, centralization, decentralization, random decentralization

中图分类号:

F224.32

翁翕，李四光. 企业内部的随机分权[J]. 运筹学学报, 2012, 16(4): 69-76.

WENG Xi, LI Siguang. Random decentralization within multi-divisional organizations[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2012, 16(4): 69-76.

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