English

运筹学学报 ›› 2022, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (4): 15-30.doi: 10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2022.04.002

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基于随机微分博弈的网约车监管问题研究

杨明歌, 孙璐璐, 梁小珍*   

  1. 上海大学管理学院, 上海 200444
  • 收稿日期:2020-10-09 发布日期:2022-11-28
  • 通讯作者: 梁小珍 E-mail:liangxz@shu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金(Nos. 11801352, 71701122)

Research on the regulation of online car-hailing based on stochastic differential game

YANG Mingge, SUN Lulu, LIANG Xiaozhen*   

  1. School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China
  • Received:2020-10-09 Published:2022-11-28

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摘要： 将地方政府、网约车平台和司机看作一个监管系统, 探讨三方博弈视角下的网约车监管问题。在无中央政府补贴的分散式决策、有中央政府补贴的分散式决策、局部联盟决策和集中式决策下, 分别构建随机微分博弈模型, 研究地方政府和网约车平台的最优监管努力程度、网约车司机的最优服务努力程度、网约车商誉的期望和方差、系统成员和系统的最优效益。结果表明:与无中央政府补贴的分散式决策相比, 有中央政府补贴的分散式决策下, 地方政府和网约车平台的最优监管努力程度、网约车司机的最优服务努力程度、网约车商誉的期望和方差、系统成员和系统的最优效益均提高；与有中央政府补贴的分散式决策相比, 局部联盟决策下, 地方政府的最优监管努力程度不变, 网约车平台的最优监管努力程度、网约车司机的最优服务努力程度、网约车商誉的期望和方差、地方政府、局部联盟和系统的最优效益均提高；与局部联盟决策相比, 集中式决策下, 地方政府和网约车平台的最优监管努力程度、网约车司机的最优服务努力程度、网约车商誉的期望和方差、系统的最优效益均提高。

关键词: 网约车, 三方博弈, 中央政府补贴, 随机微分博弈, 局部联盟

Abstract: The local government, online car-hailing platform and driver were regarded as a regulatory system to discuss the regulation of online car-hailing from the perspective of tripartite game. In decentralized decision-making without central government subsidy, decentralized decision-making with central government subsidy, local alliance decision-making and centralized decision-making, stochastic differential game models were built respectively to study the following indicators, such as the optimal degree of regulatory effort for the local government and the online car-hailing platform, the optimal degree of service effort for the online car-hailing driver, the expectation and variance of online car-hailing goodwill, the optimal benefit of the system members and system. Some important results were derived. i) Compared with decentralized decisionmaking without central government subsidy, all the above indicators increase in decentralized decision-making with central government subsidy. ii) Compared with decentralized decision-making with central government subsidy, in local alliance decision-making, the optimal degree of regulatory effort for the local government remains unchanged, while the other indicators all increase. iii) Compared with local alliance decision-making, all the above indicators increase in centralized decision-making.

Key words: online car-hailing, tripartite game, centralgovernment subsidy, stochastic differential game, local alliance

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