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Operations Research Transactions >

2026 , Vol. 30 >Issue 1: 247 - 255

DOI: https://doi.org/10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2026.01.018

Equal division value, equal surplus division value, and differential marginality

  • YU Zhiqiang ,
  • CUI Zeguang ,
  • SHAN Erfang
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  • 1. School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Taiyuan University of Science and Technology, Taiyuan 030024, Shanxi, China

Received date: 2022-07-16

  Online published: 2026-03-16

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Abstract

For cooperative games with transferable utility, equal division value and equal surplus division value are two eminent solutions, and both of them satisfy two standard axioms, additivity and symmetry. To eliminate the controversial additivity, Casajus (2011) proposes differential marginality axiom and explores the relationship between this proposed axiom and both additivity and symmetry. Inspired by Casajus (2011), we employ differential marginality to characterize the equal division value, the equal surplus division value, and their convex combinations.

Key words： cooperative games; equal division value; equal surplus division value; differential marginality

Cite this article

YU Zhiqiang , CUI Zeguang , SHAN Erfang . Equal division value, equal surplus division value, and differential marginality[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2026 , 30(1) : 247 -255 . DOI: 10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2026.01.018

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