均分值、均分剩余值与差边际性

doi:10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2026.01.018

Abstract

Abstract: For cooperative games with transferable utility, equal division value and equal surplus division value are two eminent solutions, and both of them satisfy two standard axioms, additivity and symmetry. To eliminate the controversial additivity, Casajus (2011) proposes differential marginality axiom and explores the relationship between this proposed axiom and both additivity and symmetry. Inspired by Casajus (2011), we employ differential marginality to characterize the equal division value, the equal surplus division value, and their convex combinations.

Key words: cooperative games, equal division value, equal surplus division value, differential marginality

CLC Number:

F224.32

YU Zhiqiang, CUI Zeguang, SHAN Erfang. Equal division value, equal surplus division value, and differential marginality[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2026, 30(1): 247-255.

References

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Equal division value, equal surplus division value, and differential marginality

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