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Operations Research Transactions >

2024 , Vol. 28 >Issue 3: 63 - 80

DOI: https://doi.org/10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2024.03.004

Axiomatizations of the Shapley value in cooperative games with transferable utility: A review

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  • 1. School of Mathematics and Statistics, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an 710072, Shaanxi, China

Received date: 2024-03-29

  Online published: 2024-09-07

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, 2024, All rights reserved, without authorization
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Abstract

With the increasing integration of global economy and closer international relations, win-win cooperation has become a core trend in today. As a powerful tool for studying cooperative issues, cooperative game mainly explores how to allocate the benefits generated by cooperation among players. The Shapley value, as one of the most important solutions in cooperative games, has significant research significance and value. This paper mainly introduce some research on the axiomatization of the Shapley value from the point of additivity, balanced contribution, marginality, fairness, reduced consistency, associated consistency and some special player properties. We finally give a brief summary from the perspective of future research.

Key words： cooperative game; the Shapley value; axiomatization

Cite this article

Wenzhong LI, Genjiu XU . Axiomatizations of the Shapley value in cooperative games with transferable utility: A review[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2024 , 28(3) : 63 -80 . DOI: 10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2024.03.004

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