Four-party evolutionary game for e-commerce ecosystem

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  • 1. School of Business, Suzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou 215009, Jiangsu, China
    2. School of Education, Suzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou 215009, Jiangsu, China
    3. Think Tank for Urban Development, Suzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou 215009, Jiangsu, China

Received date: 2021-05-07

  Online published: 2022-03-14

Abstract

Inspired by the frequent exposure of consumer rights protection issues in recent years, this paper aims to explore the impact of consumer behaviors on the strategic choices of other groups in the e-commerce ecosystem. For this purpose, we construct a four-party evolutionary game model, involving the government, e-commerce platforms, businesses and consumers. The evolutionary stable strategies under different conditions of the four-party evolutionary game are explored and the effect from different factors on the decision-makings of participants for the e-commerce ecosystem are also analyzed. Numerical analysis results show that consumers' complaint behaviors are conducive to promoting strict government supervision, strict management of e-commerce platforms and honest operation of merchants. Our work enriches an understanding of the governance for the the e-commerce ecosystem, and provides theoretical support for the related participants to make proper decisions in the e-commerce ecosystem.

Cite this article

Xinxin WANG, Yukun CHENG, Xiaoming TIAN, Zhiqi XU, Jinmian CHEN . Four-party evolutionary game for e-commerce ecosystem[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2022 , 26(1) : 23 -42 . DOI: 10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2022.01.002

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