电商生态系统四方演化博弈研究

doi:10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2022.01.002

Abstract

Abstract:

Inspired by the frequent exposure of consumer rights protection issues in recent years, this paper aims to explore the impact of consumer behaviors on the strategic choices of other groups in the e-commerce ecosystem. For this purpose, we construct a four-party evolutionary game model, involving the government, e-commerce platforms, businesses and consumers. The evolutionary stable strategies under different conditions of the four-party evolutionary game are explored and the effect from different factors on the decision-makings of participants for the e-commerce ecosystem are also analyzed. Numerical analysis results show that consumers' complaint behaviors are conducive to promoting strict government supervision, strict management of e-commerce platforms and honest operation of merchants. Our work enriches an understanding of the governance for the the e-commerce ecosystem, and provides theoretical support for the related participants to make proper decisions in the e-commerce ecosystem.

Key words: e-commerce ecosystem, four-party evolutionary game, evolutionary stabilization strategy, consumer behavior

CLC Number:

O225

Xinxin WANG, Yukun CHENG, Xiaoming TIAN, Zhiqi XU, Jinmian CHEN. Four-party evolutionary game for e-commerce ecosystem[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2022, 26(1): 23-42.

Figures/Tables 15

References 24

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符号	符号意义	备注
$ R_1 $	政府严格监管时的收益
$ \alpha R_1 $	政府不严格监管时的收益	$ 0{\rm{ < }}\alpha < 1 $
$ R_2 $	在严格监管条件下, 政府对宽松管理电商平台的处罚
$ R_3 $	在严格监管条件下, 政府对不诚信商家的处罚
$ R_4 $	电商平台从商家处收取的保证金
$ R_5 $	商家诚信经营的净收益
$ \delta R_5 $	商家不诚信经营的净收益	$ \delta > 1$
$ C_1 $	政府严格监管的成本
$ \beta C_1 $	政府不严格监管的成本	$ 0 < \beta {\rm{ < }}1 $
$ C_2 $	电商平台严格管理的成本
$ \gamma C_2 $	电商平台宽松管理的成本	$ 0 < \gamma {\rm{ < }}1 $
$ C_3 $	电商平台严格管理时对不诚信商家的惩罚
$ C_4 $	消费者的投诉成本
$ I_g $	消费者向政府投诉时, 政府因采取严格监管措施而获得的公信力提升
$ D_g $	消费者向政府投诉时, 政府因不严格监管导致公信力的损失
$ I_e $	消费者向电商平台投诉时, 电商平台因严格管理获得的正面影响
$ D_e $	消费者向电商平台投诉时, 电商平台因宽松管理而带来的负面影响
$ I_m $	商家声誉的提升
$ D_m $	商家声誉的损失
$ I_c $	商家诚信经营的前提下, 消费者购物获得的满意度提升
$ D_c $	商家不诚信经营的前提下, 消费者的满意度下降
$ L $	消费者投诉不诚信商家后得到的赔偿
$ Q $	消费者恶意投诉成功获得的非正常收益
$ x $	政府选择严格监管策略的概率
$ y $	电商平台采取严格管理策略的概率
$ z $	商家选择诚信经营的概率
$ w $	消费者选择投诉的概率

	政府	严格监管	不严格监管
电商平台严格管理	商家诚信	$ R_1-C_1 $，	$ \alpha R_1-\beta C_1 $
		$ I_e+R_4-C_2 $，	$ I_e+R_4-C_2 $
		$ R_5-R_4+I_m $，	$ R_5-R_4+I_m $
		$ I_c-C_4 $，	$ I_c-C_4 $
	商家不诚信	$ R_1-C_1 $，	$ \alpha R_1-\beta C_1 $
		$ I_e+R_4-C_2+C_3 $，	$ I_e+R_4-C_2+C_3 $
		$ \delta R_5-R_4-D_m-L-C_3 $，	$ \delta R_5-R_4-D_m-L-C_3 $
		$ L-D_c-C_4 $，	$ L-D_c-C_4 $
电商平台宽松管理	商家诚信	$ R_1-C_1+I_g+R_2 $，	$ \alpha R_1-D_g-\beta C_1 $
		$ R_4-R_2-D_e-\gamma C_2 $，	$ R_4-D_e-\gamma C_2 $
		$ R_5-R_4+I_m $，	$ R_5-R_4-D_m $
		$ I_c-C_4 $，	$ I_c-C_4+Q $
	商家不诚信	$ R_1-C_1+I_g+R_2+R_3 $，	$ \alpha R_1-D_g-\beta C_1 $
		$ R_4-R_2-D_e-\gamma C_2 $，	$ R_4-D_e-\gamma C_2 $
		$ \delta R_5-R_4-D_m-L-R_3 $，	$ \delta R_5-R_4-D_m $
		$ L-D_c-C_4 $，	$ -D_c-C_4 $

	政府	严格监管	不严格监管
电商平台严格管理	商家诚信	$ R_1-C_1 $，	$ \alpha R_1-\beta C_1 $
		$ R_4-C_2 $，	$ R_4-C_2 $
		$ R_5-R_4+I_m $，	$ R_5-R_4+I_m $
		$ I_c $，	$ I_c $
	商家不诚信	$ R_1-C_1 $，	$ \alpha R_1-\beta C_1 $
		$ R_4-C_2+C_3 $，	$ R_4-C_2+C_3 $
		$ \delta R_5-R_4-C_3-D_m $，	$ \delta R_5-R_4-C_3-D_m $
		$ -D_c $，	$ -D_c $
电商平台宽松管理	商家诚信	$ R_1-C_1+R_2 $，	$ \alpha R_1-\beta C_1 $
		$ R_4-R_2-\gamma C_2 $，	$ R_4-\gamma C_2 $
		$ R_5-R_4+I_m $，	$ R_5-R_4 $
		$ I_c $	$ I_c $
	商家不诚信	$ R_1-C_1+R_2+R_3 $，	$ \alpha R_1-\beta C_1 $
		$ R_4-R_2-\gamma C_2 $，	$ R_4-\gamma C_2 $
		$ \delta R_5-R_4-R_3-D_m $，	$ \delta R_5-R_4 $
		$ -D_c $，	$ -D_c $

均衡点	特征值	正负符号	稳定性	条件
$ (0, 0, 0, 0) $	$((1-\alpha)R_1-C_1+\beta C_1+R_2+R_3)$, $(C_3-C_2+\gamma C_2)$, $(R_5-\delta R_5)$, $-C_4$	$ (U, U, -, -) $	$ ESS $	$ (2) $
$ (0, 1, 0, 0) $	$(R_1-C_1+\beta C_1-\alpha R_1)$, $(-C_3+ C_2-\gamma C_2)$, $(I_m+C_3+D_m+R_5-\delta R_5)$, $(L-C_4)$	$ ( -, U, +, U) $	不稳定
$ (0, 1, 1, 0) $	$(R_1-C_1+\beta C_1-\alpha R_1)$, $(C_2-\gamma C_2)$, $-(I_m+C_3+D_m+R_5-\delta R_5)$, $-C_4$	$ (-, +, -, -) $	不稳定
$ (0, 0, 1, 0) $	$(R_1-C_1+\beta C_1-\alpha R_1+R_2)$, $(-C_2+\gamma C_2)$, $-(R_5-\delta R_5)$, $(-C_4+Q)$	$ (U, -, +, U) $	不稳定
$ (1, 0, 0, 0) $	$-(R_1-C_1+\beta C_1-\alpha R_1+R_2+R_3)$, $(C_3-C_2+R_2+\gamma C_2)$, $(I_m+R_3+D_m+R_5-\delta R_5)$, $(L-C_4)$	$ (U, U, +, U) $	不稳定
$ (1, 1, 0, 0) $	$-(R_1-C_1+\beta C_1-\alpha R_1)$, $-(C_3-C_2+R_2+\gamma C_2)$, $(I_m+C_3+D_m+R_5-\delta R_5)$, $(L-C_4)$	$ ( U, U, +, U) $	不稳定
$ (1, 1, 1, 0) $	$-(R_1-C_1+\beta C_1-\alpha R_1)$, $-(-C_2+R_2+\gamma C_2)$, $-(I_m+C_3+D_m+R_5-\delta R_5)$, $-C_4$	$ (+, U, -, -) $	不稳定
$ (1, 0, 1, 0) $	$-(R_1-C_1+\beta C_1-\alpha R_1+R_2)$, $(-C_2+R_2+\gamma C_2)$, $-(I_m+R_3+D_m+R_5-\delta R_5)$, $-C_4$	$ (U, U, -, -) $	$ ESS $	$ (1) $

均衡点	特征值	正负符号	稳定性
$ (0, 1, 1, 1) $	$[(1-\alpha)R_1-(1-\beta)C_1]$, $-[I_e+D_e-(1-\gamma)C_2]$, $-[I_m+C_3+D_m+(1-\delta)R_5+L]$, $C_4$	$ (-, U, -, +) $	不稳定
$ (0, 1, 0, 1) $	$[(1-\alpha)R_1-(1-\beta)C_1]$, $[-C_3-I_e-D_e-(1-\gamma)C_2]$, $[I_m+C_3+D_m+(1-\delta)R_5+L]$, $-(L-C_4)$	$ (-, U, +, U) $	不稳定
$ (0, 0, 0, 1) $	$[(1-\alpha)R_1-(1-\beta)C_1+R_3+R_2+I_g+D_g]$, $[I_e+D_e+C_3-(1-\gamma)C_2]$, $(1-\delta)R_5$, $C_4$	$ (U, U, -, +) $	不稳定
$ (0, 0, 1, 1) $	$[(1-\alpha)R_1-(1-\beta)C_1+R_2+I_g+D_g]$, $[I_e+D_e-(1-\gamma)C_2]$, $-(1-\delta)R_5$, $(C_4-Q)$	$ (U, U, +, U) $	不稳定
$ (1, 0, 0, 1) $	$-[(1-\alpha)R_1-(1-\beta)C_1+R_3+R_2+I_g+D_g]$, $[I_e+D_e+C_3+R_2-(1-\gamma)C_2]$, $[I_m+R_3+D_m+(1-\delta)R_5+L]$, $-(L-C_4)$	$ (U, U, +, U) $	不稳定
$ (1, 1, 0, 1) $	$-(R_1-C_1+\beta C_1-\alpha R_1)$, $-(I_e+D_e+C_3-C_2+R_2+\gamma C_2)$, $[I_m+C_3+D_m+(1-\delta)R_5+L]$, $-(L-C_4)$	$ (+, U, +, U) $	不稳定
$ (1, 1, 1, 1) $	$-(R_1-C_1+\beta C_1-\alpha R_1)$, $-(I_e+D_e-C_2+R_2+\gamma C_2)$, $-(I_m+C_3+D_m+R_5-\delta R_5+L)$, $C_4$	$ (+, U, -, +) $	不稳定
$ (1, 0, 1, 1) $	$-(R_1-C_1+\beta C_1-\alpha R_1+R_2+I_g+D_g)$, $(I_e+D_e-C_2+R_2+\gamma C_2)$, $-(I_m+R_3+D_m+R_5-\delta R_5+L)$, $C_4$	$ (U, U, -, +) $	不稳定

Four-party evolutionary game for e-commerce ecosystem

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