Abstract:

Due to the scarcity of information, the uncertainty of the service system and the limited cognitive ability of customers, it is difficult for customers to estimate the expected utility after receiving the service accurately, and then make rational decisions. In this paper, the Logit choice model is used to describe the strategic behavior of boundedly rational customers, based on queueing game theory, the customer equilibrium strategy, revenue and social welfare is analyzed under almost unobservable case and fully unobservable case, the influence of customer boundedly rationality on the optimal revenue and optimal social welfare under the two information levels is compared through numerical case. The results show that, under the two information levels, the equilibrium strategy of boundedly rational customers exists and is unique; There is a unique optimal price that maximizes the revenue; There is a unique optimal price that maximizes the social welfare; As the average vacation time decreases, customers prefer to enter the system, revenue increases and so does social welfare. In addition, under the fully unobservable case, the variation of social welfare with respect to the bounded rationality level of customers depends on the service price and is a unimodal function of the bounded rationality level of customers; There exists a specific bounded rationality level such that revenue and social welfare are simultaneously maximized.

Key words: queueing economics, boundedly rational customer, vacation queues