Operations Research Transactions ›› 2025, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (2): 1-20.doi: 10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2025.02.001
• Research Article • Next Articles
Yali DONG1, Kai KANG2, Boyu ZHANG2,*(
)
Received:2023-01-14
Online:2025-06-15
Published:2025-06-12
Contact:
Boyu ZHANG
E-mail:zhangby@bnu.edu.cn
CLC Number:
Yali DONG, Kai KANG, Boyu ZHANG. A survey of data driven approach for human cooperation and competition[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2025, 29(2): 1-20.
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