Operations Research Transactions ›› 2013, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (3): 101-107.

• Original Articles • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Existence of strong Berge equilibrium under uncertainty

DENG Xicai1,2,*, XIANG Shuwen1, ZUO Yu2   

  1. 1. Department of Mathematics, Guizhou University, Gui Yang 550025, China 2. Department of Mathematics and Computer, GuiZhou Normal College, GuiYang 550018, China
  • Online:2013-09-15 Published:2013-09-15

Abstract:  Under the assumption that the domain of the undetermined parameters is known, the existence of strong Berge equilibrium for non-cooperative games and generalized non-cooperative games are investigated. Based on the concept of strong Berge equilibrium and NS-equilibrium for non-cooperative games under uncertainty, the notions of strong Berge equilibrium for non-cooperative games and generalized non-cooperative games under uncertainty are defined. Further, the existence of the equilibrium for non-cooperative games and generalized non-cooperative games are proved by using Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem. Finally, a numeric example illustrates the feasibility of the proposed method.

Key words: non-cooperative games, generalized non-cooperative games, uncertainty, strong Berge equilibrium, existence

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