[1] Dempe S. Foundations of Bilevel Programming[M]. New York:Springer, 2002. [2] Dempe S, Zemkoho A B. Bilevel Optimization:Advances and Next Challenges[M]. Cham:Springer International Publishing, 2020. [3] 高自友, 宋一凡, 四兵峰. 城市交通连续平衡网络设计:理论与方法[M]. 北京:中国铁道出版社, 2000. [4] 腾春贤, 李智慧. 二层规划的理论与应用[M]. 北京:科学出版社, 2002. [5] Wang Y P, Jiao Y C, Li H. An evolutionary algorithm for solving nonlinear bilevel programming based on a new constraint handling scheme[J]. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics-Part C, 2005, 35:221-232. [6] Zheng Y, Wan Z P, Wang G M. A fuzzy interactive method for a class of bilevel multiobjective programming problem[J]. Expert Systems with Applications, 2011, 38:10384-10388. [7] Dai T, Qiao W. Optimal bidding strategy of a strategic wind power producer in the short-term market[J]. IEEE Transactions Sustainable Energy, 2015, 6:707-719. [8] Baghighat H, Zeng B. Bilevel mixed integer transmission Expansion planning[J]. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2018, 33:7309-7312. [9] Baghighat H, Zeng B. Bilevel conic transmission expansion planning[J]. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2018, 33:4640-4642. [10] Liu R S, Mu P, Yuan X M, et al. A generic first-order algorithmic framework for bi-level programming beyond lower-level singleton[C]//International Conference on Machine Learning, 2020. [11] Mirrlees J. Theory of moral hazard and unobservable behavior:Part I[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 2010, 66:3-21. [12] Holmstrom B. Moral hazard and observability[J]. The Bell journal of economics, 1979, 10:74-91. [13] 柯荣住, 李晋. 霍姆斯特朗的契约理论"四重奏". 财新观点[EB/OL]. (2016-10-25)[2021-03-05]. https://opinion.caixin.com/2016-10-25/101000367.html. [14] 聂辉华. 不完全契约理论对中国改革的启迪. 财新博客[EB/OL]. (2016-10-11)[2021-03-05]. http://niehuihua.blog.caixin.com/archives/152331. [15] Rogerson W P. The first-order approach to principal-agent problems[J]. Econometrica:Journal of the Econometric Society, 1985, 53:1357-1367. [16] Jewitt I. Justifying the first-order approach to principal-agent problems[J]. Econometrica:Journal of the Econometric Society, 1988, 56:1177-1190. [17] Sinclair-Desgagne B. The first-order approach to multi-signal principal-agent problems[J]. Econometrica:Journal of the Econometric Society, 1994, 62:459-465. [18] Conlon J R. Two new conditions supporting the first-order approach to multisignal principalagent problems[J]. Econometrica, 2009, 77(1):249-278. [19] Conlon J R. Supplement to "Two new conditions supporting the first-order approach to multisignal principal-agent problems"[J]. Econometrica Supplementary Material, 2009, 77(1):249-278. [20] Ke R. Essays on Contract Theory[D]. Cambrige:Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009. [21] Ke R. A fixed-point method for validating the first-order approach[EB/OL]. (2012-01-15)[2021-03-05]. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/266173890 FixedPoint Method for Validating the First-Order Approach. [22] Kirkegaard R. Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach[J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, 102:373-387. [23] Kirkegaard R. A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems[J]. Theoretical Economics, 2017, 12(1):25-51. [24] Jung J Y, Kim S K. Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, 160:243-279. [25] Jewitt I, Kadan O, Swinkels J M. Moral hazard with bounded payments[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, 143(1):59-82. [26] Kadan O, Reny P J, Swinkels J M. Existence of optimal mechanisms in principal-agent problems[J]. Econometrica, 2017, 85(3):769-823. [27] Ke R, X Xu. On the existence of optimal contract in the pure moral hazard problems[C]//the 11th Bi-Annual Conference of Economic Design,Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary, June 12-14, 2019. [28] Fagart M C, Sinclair-Desgagne B. Ranking contingent monitoring systems[J]. Management Science, 2007, 53(9):1501-1509. [29] Alvi E. First-order approach to principal-agent problems:a generalization[J]. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, 1997, 22(1):59-65. [30] Grossman S J, Hart O D. An analysis of the principal-agent problem[J]. Econometrica, 1983, 51:7-45. [31] Luenberger D G. Optimization by Vector Space Methods[M]. New York:John Wiley & Sons, 1969. [32] Gauvin J. A necessary and sufficient regularity condition to have bounded multipliers in nonconvex programming[J]. Mathematical Programming, 1977, 12(1):136-138. [33] Hart O, Holmstrom B. The Economics of Contracts[C]//Advances in Economic Theory:Proceedings of the Fifth World Congress of the Econometric Society, 1987. [34] LiCalzi M, Spaeter S. Distributions for the first-order approach to principal-agent problems[J]. Economic Theory, 2003, 21(1):167-173. |