突发公共卫生事件中地方政府、社会组织与公众的相互配合、协同响应是及时高效进行应急管理的必然选择。本文以新型冠状病毒肺炎为背景, 考虑应急响应过程中多主体之间的相互影响与博弈关系, 基于有限理性假设, 构建地方政府、社会组织与公众三方博弈主体的演化博弈动态模型。然后, 运用演化博弈理论和Lyapunov判别法分析三方主体演化模型的均衡点和渐进稳定性, 得到在不同条件下三方主体的演化稳定策略。最后, 对突发公共卫生事件不同阶段的三方主体应急响应的博弈行为进行仿真分析, 探讨地方政府的补贴政策、奖惩措施以及社会组织成本对博弈各方策略选择的影响。研究结果表明: (1) 在突发公共卫生事件应急响应的不同阶段, 各主体的决策选择是动态演变的; (2) 地方政府的补贴政策、奖惩措施以及社会组织成本对于主体的应急响应行为作用明显; (3) 各主体的初始参与意愿强弱对突发公共卫生事件应急响应的影响效果显著。

The mutual cooperation and coordinated response of local governments, social organizations and the public in public health emergencies is an inevitable choice for timely and efficient emergency management. By taking the COVID-19 epidemic as the background, we consider the interaction and game relationship between multiple subjects in the emergency response process, and based on the assumption of bounded rationality, constructs a dynamic game model of the evolution of the three parties of the local government, social organizations and the public. Then, by using evolutionary game theory and Lyapunov discriminant method to analyze the equilibrium point and asymptotic stability of the tripartite evolution model, we obtain the evolutionary stable strategy of the tripartite subject under different conditions. Finally, the game behavior of the tripartite emergency response in different stages of public health emergencies is simulated and analyzed, and the influence of local government subsidy policies, reward and punishment measures, and social organization costs on the strategic choices of all parties in the game are discussed. The research results show that: (1) in different stages of emergency response to public health emergencies, the decision-making choices of each subject evolve dynamically; (2) local government subsidy policies, reward and punishment measures, and social organization costs have a significant effect on the subject's emergency response behavior; (3) the initial participation willingness of each subject has a significant impact on the emergency response to public health emergencies.