拍卖机制设计在区块链中的应用与挑战

doi:10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2023.01.001

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

区块链是新一代信息技术的重要组成部分，是分布式网络、加密技术、智能合约等多种技术集成的新型数据库软件。过去的十多年，区块链技术在全球范围内产生广泛影响。如今的区块链技术，已从最初的关注于解决货币和支付的去中心化问题，转入到解决市场的去中心化问题。智能合约的出现使得基于区块链技术的去中心化金融进入高速发展状态，也涌现出区块链环境下的各类拍卖场景。本文首次从机制设计角度，以区块链交易费机制，非同质化代币(Non-Fungible Token，NFT)拍卖和矿工可提取价值(Miner-Extractable Value，MEV)交易位置拍卖为主要对象，总结和剖析近些年来区块链上特有的拍卖机制；并针对区块链特性，提出区块链上拍卖机制设计所面临的挑战和未来亟待解决的问题。

关键词: 区块链, 拍卖, 交易费机制, NFT, MEV, 智能合约

Abstract:

Blockchain is an important part of the new generation of information technology. It is a new database software integrated with distributed network, encryption technology, smart contract and other technologies. Over the past decade, blockchain technology has had a wide impact on a global scale. Today's blockchain technology has shifted from its initial focus on the decentralization of cryptocurrency and payment to the decentralization of the market. The emergence of smart contract makes the decentralized finance (De-Fi) based on blockchain technology enter a state of rapid development, and various auction scenarios in the context of blockchain also emerge. From the perspective of mechanism design, this paper is the first to summarize and analyze the auction mechanisms on the blockchain in recent years by taking the transaction fee mechanism, NFT auction and MEV auction as the main objects. In addition, we also highlight the challenges and the open problems of the auction mechanism design, based on the characteristics of blockchain.

Key words: blockchain, auction, transaction fee, NFT, MEV, smart contract

中图分类号:

O225
TP3-05

陈宏崟, 程郁琨, 邓小铁, 姚章豪. 拍卖机制设计在区块链中的应用与挑战[J]. 运筹学学报（中英文）, 2023, 27(1): 1-29.

Hongyin CHEN, Yukun CHENG, Xiaotie DENG, Zhanghao YAO. Auction in blockchain: Applications and challenges[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2023, 27(1): 1-29.

图/表 4

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