The stability of Nash equilibria for generalized games under graph topology of feasible strategy correspondence

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  • 1. School of Mathematics and Statistics, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, China 2. School of Mathematics and Statistics, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025, China

Received date: 2015-12-14

  Online published: 2017-09-15

Abstract

For the stability of generalized games' Nash equilibria, current researches are investigated by uniform metric topology of feasible strategy correspondence. However, this paper presents a weaker metric and uses Hausdorff distance of graph of feasible strategy correspondence to study the stability of Nash equilibria. Under weaker graph topology, we prove that the space of generalized games is complete, and Nash equilibrium correspondence is upper semi-continuous and compact-valued. These lead to generic stability of generalized games' Nash equilibria, i.e., in the sense of Baire category, most of generalized games are essential.

Cite this article

CHEN Pinbo, WANG Nengfa, QIU Xiaoling, WANG Chun .

The stability of Nash equilibria for generalized games under graph topology of feasible strategy correspondence
[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2017 , 21(3) : 77 -85 . DOI: 10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2017.03.008

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