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Operations Research Transactions >

2015 , Vol. 19 >Issue 4: 97 - 106

DOI: https://doi.org/10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2015.04.009

A non-empty condition and an axiomatization  for the core of multi-choice NTU games

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  • 1.Department of Applied Mathematics, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an 710072, China; 2.College of Mathematics and Information Science, Hebei Normal University, Shijiazhuang 050024, China

Received date: 2015-02-06

  Online published: 2015-12-15

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Abstract

This paper introduces the concept of \pi-balanced multi-choice NTU games and proves that any \pi-balanced multi-choice NTU game has a non-empty core. The definitions of non-leveled multi-choice NTU games and reduced games are introduced and the concepts of consistency and converse consistency are also given. An axiomatization for the core of non-leveled multi-choice NTU games is provided by using individual rationality, one-person rationality, consistency and converse consistency.

Key words：  multi-choice NTU games; cores; \pi-balancedness; consistency

Cite this article

TIAN Haiyan, ZHANG Gang . A non-empty condition and an axiomatization  for the core of multi-choice NTU games[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2015 , 19(4) : 97 -106 . DOI: 10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2015.04.009

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