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Operations Research Transactions >

2015 , Vol. 19 >Issue 2: 111 - 126

DOI: https://doi.org/10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2015.02.013

Capacitated house market model with tenant under weak preferences

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  • 1. College of Mathematics and Statistics, Hubei Normal University, Huangshi 435002, Hubei, China

Received date: 2013-05-04

  Online published: 2015-06-15

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Abstract

In this paper, the capacitated house market model with tenant under weak preferences problem has been considered. According to this model, we propose a kind of algorithm mechanism which is the extension of TTC algorithm, known as the Remove Selection algorithm(called CTTC) mechanism. In addition, we show that this kind of mechanism by using CTTC of the model satisfies individual rationality, Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof, and the complexity of CTTC algorithm is O(n_{1}^{2}(n_{1}n_{2}+n_{2}^{2})), where n_{1} is the number of agents, n_{2} is the number of the house.

Key words： house allocation; elasticity; virtual participants; Pareto-efficient; strategy-proof

Cite this article

WU Weirang,CHEN Jinyang,WENG Yalan . Capacitated house market model with tenant under weak preferences[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2015 , 19(2) : 111 -126 . DOI: 10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2015.02.013

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