The local government, online car-hailing platform and driver were regarded as a regulatory system to discuss the regulation of online car-hailing from the perspective of tripartite game. In decentralized decision-making without central government subsidy, decentralized decision-making with central government subsidy, local alliance decision-making and centralized decision-making, stochastic differential game models were built respectively to study the following indicators, such as the optimal degree of regulatory effort for the local government and the online car-hailing platform, the optimal degree of service effort for the online car-hailing driver, the expectation and variance of online car-hailing goodwill, the optimal benefit of the system members and system. Some important results were derived. i) Compared with decentralized decisionmaking without central government subsidy, all the above indicators increase in decentralized decision-making with central government subsidy. ii) Compared with decentralized decision-making with central government subsidy, in local alliance decision-making, the optimal degree of regulatory effort for the local government remains unchanged, while the other indicators all increase. iii) Compared with local alliance decision-making, all the above indicators increase in centralized decision-making.
YANG Mingge, SUN Lulu, LIANG Xiaozhen
. Research on the regulation of online car-hailing based on stochastic differential game[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2022
, 26(4)
: 15
-30
.
DOI: 10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2022.04.002
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