Considering a stochastic game model of data transmission in a network of a given topology. Two players (source nodes) try to transmit packages to the destination node through a common node. These packages are divided into important packages and not important packages. Each player has a buffer of limited capacity to store packages. We define a system of cost and reward, and this dynamic conflict control process is modeled as stochastic game with a finite set of states. We study the non-cooperative and cooperative behaviors of players. We calculate the Nash equilibrium under the noncooperative situation. Shapley value is chosen as the solution of the cooperation game. We discuss the subgame consistency of Shapley value and propose a imputation distribution procedure.
XUE Juan, GAO Hongwei, JIANG Hui, ZHOU Yunxun
. Two-person stochastic game model of data transmission based on slotted ALOHA protocol[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2019
, 23(4)
: 45
-58
.
DOI: 10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2019.04.004
[1] Roberts L G. ALOHA packet system with and without slots and capture[J]. ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, 1975, 5(2):28-42.
[2] Altman E, Barman D, Azouzi R E, et al. A game theoretic approach for delay minimization in slotted ALOHA[C]//2004 IEEE International Conference on Communications. Paris:IEEE, 2004, 3999-4003.
[3] Marban S, Van de ven P, Borm P, et al. ALOHA networks:a game-theoretic approach[J]. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2013, 78(2):221-242.
[4] Sagduyu Y E, Ephremides A. A game-theoretic look at simple relay channel[J]. Wireless Networks, 2006, 12(5):545-560.
[5] Afghah F, Razi A, Abedi A. Stochastic game theoretical model for packet forwarding in relay network[J]. Telecommunication Systems, 2013, 52(4):1877-1893.
[6] Herings P J-J, Peeters R J A P. Stationary equilibria in stochastic games:structure, selection, and computation[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2004, 118(1):32-60.
[7] Jaskiewicz A, Nowak A. On pure stationary almost Markov Nash equilibria in nonzero-sum ARAT stochastic games[J]. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2015, 81(2):169-179.
[8] Rosenberg D, Solan E, Vieille N. The max-min value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring[J]. International Journal of Game Theory, 2003, 32(1):133-150.
[9] Petrosyan L A. Cooperative stochastic games[M]//Advances in Dynamic Games, Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games. Boston:Birkhäuser, 2006, 139-146.
[10] Petrosyan L A, Baranova E V. Cooperative stochastic games in stationary strategies[M]//Game Theory and Applications. New York:Nova Science Publishers, 2006, 7-17.
[11] Petrosyan L A. Stable solutions of differential games with many participants[J]. Viestnik of Leningrad University, 1977, 19:46-52.
[12] Petrosyan L A, Danilov N N. Stability of solutions in non-zero sum differential games with transferable payoffs[J]. Vestnik of Leningrad University, 1979, 1:52-59.
[13] Parilina E M. Strategic support of the Shapley value in stochastic games[J]. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2016, 9:246-265.
[14] Lemke C E, Howson J T. Equilibrium points of bimatrix games[J]. Journal of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 1964, 12(2):413-423.
[15] Fink A M. Equilibrium in a stochastic n-person game[J]. Journal of Science of the Hiroshima University, Series A-I (Mathematics), 1964, 28(1):89-93.
[16] 高红伟, 彼得罗相(俄). 动态合作博弈[M]. 北京:科学出版社, 2009.
[17] Dockner E J, Jorgensen S, Long N V, et al. Differential games in economics and management science[M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2000.
[18] Aumann R J, Peleg B. Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments[J]. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 1960, 66(3):173-180.
[19] Gao H W, Petrosyan L A, Qiao H, et al. Cooperation in two-stage games on undirected networks[J]. Journal of Systems Science and Complexity, 2017, 30(3):680-693.
[20] Wang L, Gao H W, Petrosyan L A, et al. Strategically supported cooperation in dynamic games with coalition structures[J]. Science China-Mathematics, 2016, 59(5):1015-1028.