合作博弈两类组合解的社会可接受性

doi:10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2024.03.008

Abstract

Abstract:

How to determine fair and reasonable allocation schemes (i.e. solutions of the game) is an important research content of cooperative games. The marginal distribution principle based on the contribution of players and the social distribution principle considering the internal connections of players are widely used in the definition of solutions. Various combination solutions usually reflect both types of these two distribution principles. In response to the problem of exogeneity and lack of reasonable explanation of combination parameters in existing combination solutions, this paper utilizes the social acceptability of solutions to mainly analyze two types of combination solutions based on Shapley value, Solidarity value, ENSC value, and equal division value. Sufficient (necessary) conditions for selecting parameter range in combination solutions are given, and the relationship between different social acceptability is elucidated. Furthermore, we reveal the impact of combination coefficients on the behavior of players.

Key words: cooperative game, distribution principle, combination solution, social acceptability

CLC Number:

O225

Panfei SUN, Hao SUN. Social acceptability for two combination solutions of cooperative games[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2024, 28(3): 121-131.

Figures/Tables 1

References 17

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情景	Ⅰ型	Ⅱ型	Ⅲ型
均分值	√	√	√
ENSC值	×	×	√
Shapley值	√	×	√
Solidarity值	√	√	√

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Social acceptability for two combination solutions of cooperative games

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