Operations Research Transactions ›› 2024, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (3): 63-80.doi: 10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2024.03.004
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Received:
2024-03-29
Online:
2024-09-15
Published:
2024-09-07
Contact:
Genjiu XU
E-mail:xugenjiu@nwpu.edu.cn
CLC Number:
Wenzhong LI, Genjiu XU. Axiomatizations of the Shapley value in cooperative games with transferable utility: A review[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2024, 28(3): 63-80.
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