均分值和均分剩余值是平均主义思想下最具代表性的两种分配规则,且两者都满足经典的可加性和对称性。Casajus (2011) 引入差边际性公理,并详细阐述了该公理与可加性和对称性之间的联系。基于此,本文运用差边际性重新刻画了均分值和均分剩余值。本文同样介绍了均分值和均分剩余值的凸组合形式,并给出相应地公理化刻画。
For cooperative games with transferable utility, equal division value and equal surplus division value are two eminent solutions, and both of them satisfy two standard axioms, additivity and symmetry. To eliminate the controversial additivity, Casajus (2011) proposes differential marginality axiom and explores the relationship between this proposed axiom and both additivity and symmetry. Inspired by Casajus (2011), we employ differential marginality to characterize the equal division value, the equal surplus division value, and their convex combinations.
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