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运筹学学报 >

2024 , Vol. 28 >Issue 4: 91 - 100

DOI: https://doi.org/10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2024.04.008

 

有效均分补偿值的公理化刻画及其应用

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  • 1. 上海大学管理学院, 上海 200444
    2. 上海公安学院, 上海 200137
赵加贵, E-mail: 416526575@qq.com

收稿日期: 2021-02-07

  网络出版日期: 2024-12-20

基金资助

国家自然科学基金(72371151)

版权

运筹学学报编辑部, 2024, 版权所有，未经授权。
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Alternative axiomatic characterization of the efficient compensation solution with applications

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  • 1. School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China
    2. Shanghai Police College, Shanghai 200137, China

Received date: 2021-02-07

  Online published: 2024-12-20

Copyright

, 2024, All rights reserved, without authorization
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摘要

补偿值是图对策上一类重要的分支有效解。2018年, Béal等将这一分支有效解推广为有效解, 并给出了公理化刻画。本文给出了有效均分补偿值的新的公理化刻画。首先证明了有效均分补偿值可以由有效性、相对公平性以及剩余公平分配所唯一确定。其次, 通过应用案例对该值与其他值进行了比较分析。

关键词： 合作对策; 无圈图; 有效均分补偿值; 剩余公平分配

本文引用格式

曾满嫦, 赵加贵, 单而芳 . 有效均分补偿值的公理化刻画及其应用[J]. 运筹学学报, 2024 , 28(4) : 91 -100 . DOI: 10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2024.04.008

Abstract

The compensation solution is one of the important component efficient allocation rules for cycle-free graph game. Béal et al.(2018) proposed and characterized its efficient extension. In this paper, we propose an alternative axiomatic characterization of the efficient compensation solution. We first show that the efficient compensation solution can be characterized by efficiency, relative fairness and fair distribution of surplus. Secondly, we compare this value with other allocation rules through an application example.

Key words： cooperative game; cycle-free graph; efficient compensation solution; fair distribution of surplus

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