运筹学学报 >
2024 , Vol. 28 >Issue 2: 58 - 70
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2024.02.004
一带一路背景下基于加权Owen值的多层次合作分配策略
收稿日期: 2021-09-09
网络出版日期: 2024-06-07
基金资助
国家自然科学基金(72171024);国家自然科学基金(71801016);国家自然科学基金(72074002)
版权
An allocation scheme of multilevel cooperative games based on a weighted Owen value under the Belt and Road Initiative
Received date: 2021-09-09
Online published: 2024-06-07
Copyright
联盟结构合作对策一般涉及两个层次合作: 局中人先组成小联盟, 然后再以小联盟整体参与大联盟的合作。由于一带一路倡议中小联盟群体参与合作项目往往话语权有限, 容易处于收益分配的劣势, 从而影响参与合作项目的积极性, 因而有必要对联盟结构合作对策及其求解方法做进一步的研究。基于此, 我们首先构造一种能够考虑小联盟规模对合作影响的新求解方法——加权Owen值。然后, 基于联盟结构合作对策与加权Owen值刻画一带一路倡议下的多层次、复杂交叉的合作关系, 获得各个单位参与跨境合作项目可能的收益分配范围及性质。最后, 通过算例演示了联盟结构合作对策分配策略的计算方法。因此, 基于加权Owen值计算各个单位参与跨境合作项目可能的收益分配范围, 为跨境合作的大项目提供一定的决策依据。
于晓辉, 李武, 李汉章 . 一带一路背景下基于加权Owen值的多层次合作分配策略[J]. 运筹学学报, 2024 , 28(2) : 58 -70 . DOI: 10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2024.02.004
The cooperative game with coalition structure generally involves two levels of cooperation: in which the players first form a small coalition, and then participate in the cooperation of the big coalition as a whole. In the One Belt, One Road Initiative, small sized alliance groups often have a weak voice in participating in cooperation projects, so they are easily at the disadvantages of profit distribution and their cooperative enthusiasm are affected. Therefore, it is necessary to further study the cooperative game with coalition structure and its solution. Based on this, a new solution method (i.e., weighted Owen value) is proposed in this paper, which can consider the impact of small coalition size on the cooperation. Then, based on the cooperative game with coalition structure and weighted Owen value, we describe the multi-level and complex cooperation relationship in the One Belt, One Road Initiative. The possible range of profit distribution are gotten for the player in the cross-border cooperation projects. Thus, the proposed weighted Owen value can be used to get a possible profit distribution range for each participant in cross border cooperation projects, which may provide a theoretical decision basis for the cross border largescale projects.
Key words: cooperative game; coalition structure; weight
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