考虑网络销售环境下企业基于消费者行为定价(BBP) 现象愈发凸显的现实, 本文建立了由一个电商平台和一个制造商所组成的网络渠道决策模型, 分别分析了制造商自建网络直接渠道模式和进驻电商平台模式下的相关决策问题, 并对不同模式下的均衡决策进行了比较。结果发现, 制造商自建网络直接渠道模式下, 电商平台将为新顾客提供较老顾客更低的价格, 而制造商则会根据自建渠道成本和消费者的购物成本来区别对待新老顾客; 制造商进驻电商平台模式下, 制造商会为新顾客提供更优惠的价格, 电商平台对待新老顾客的策略受佣金率的影响。此外, 当佣金率较低且平台使用费适中, 或佣金率适中且平台使用费较低时可以使得电商平台吸引制造商进驻的同时制造商也愿意进驻电商平台。最后, 我们发现要使得制造商自建网络直接渠道能够实施BBP需保证其自建渠道时单位产品的销售成本足够小; 而要使得制造商进驻电商平台时能够实施BBP则需保证电商平台收取的佣金率和平台使用费较低。借鉴算例发现, 制造商进驻电商平台能获得较自建网络直接渠道更多的生产者剩余, 而消费者剩余的情况刚好相反; 只有当消费者购物成本较大且佣金率较高时, 制造商进驻电商平台才会获得较自建渠道情形更多的社会福利。

By considering the fact of the increasingly prominent phenomenon of consumer Behavior-Based Pricing (BBP) in the internet sales environment, we establish an internet channel decision model that is constituted by an e-commerce platform and a manufacturer. The decision problems about the manufacturer building its own internet direct channel mode and entering the e-commerce platform mode are analyzed respectively. Equilibrium decisions in the two modes are compared. Results show that if the manufacturer establishes its own internet direct channel, the e-commerce platform will offer lower price for new customers than for existing customers, while the manufacturer will treat new and existing customers differently based on the cost of building own channel and consumers' shopping cost. Under the manufacturer enters the e-commerce platform mode, the manufacturer will offer lower price for new customers, and the e-commerce platform's strategy for new and existing customers is influenced by commission rate. Moreover, when the commission rate is small and the licensing fee is moderate, or when the commission rate is moderate and the licensing fee is small can make the e-commerce platform will be willing to attract the manufacturer to move in and at the same time the manufacturer will choose to enter the e-commerce platform. Finally, we find that in order to enable the two participants to implement BBP when the manufacturer builds its own internet direct channel, it is necessary to ensure that the sales cost per unit product is small enough when it builds its own channel. In order to enable the two participants to implement BBP when the manufacturer enters the e-commerce platform, it is necessary to ensure that the commission rate and licensing fee charged by the e-commerce platform are low. The numerical analysis results show that it can generate more producer surplus than building its own internet direct channel if the manufacturer enters into the e-commerce platform, while the opposite is true for consumer surplus. Furthermore, if consumers' shopping cost and commission rate are large, the manufacturer enters into the e-commerce platform will generate more social welfare than in the case of establishing its own internet channel.