图博弈的过程比例解

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  • 1. 上海理工大学管理学院, 上海 200093
    2. 上海大学理学院, 上海 200444
邬冬华, E-mail: dhwu@staff.shu.edu.cn

收稿日期: 2019-03-21

  网络出版日期: 2021-12-11

基金资助

国家自然科学基金(71901145);上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(2019EGL010)

The procedural proportional solution for graph games

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  • 1. Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China
    2. College of Sciences, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China

Received date: 2019-03-21

  Online published: 2021-12-11

摘要

本文对具有图结构合作博弈(图博弈)进行了研究,采用比例原则和过程化分配方法,定义了比例分配过程,并对其性质进行了分析。随后,针对比例分配过程的超有效情况,运用等比例妥协的方式给出满足有效性的过程比例解,并研究了稳定性。最后,将比例分配过程与过程比例解应用到破产问题中,得到图博弈过程比例解与破产问题比例规则等价的结论。

本文引用格式

张广, 肖文君, 邬冬华 . 图博弈的过程比例解[J]. 运筹学学报, 2021 , 25(4) : 101 -110 . DOI: 10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2021.04.009

Abstract

This paper studies cooperative games with graph structure, shortly graph games. By applying the proportional rule and procedural method in feasible coalitions, a so-called proportional procedure is defined and studied regarding concepts and properties. And then, according to the over-efficiency of the proposed procedure, an efficient solution concept, the procedural proportional solution, is provided by compromising with equalratio. Moreover, the stability of the solution is also investigated. Finally, the bankruptcy problems is discussed by using the proportional procedure and the procedural proportional solution, and we obtain that the proposed solution of the related graph game coincides with the proportional rule of the bankruptcy problem.

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