在图博弈中，Myerson假设只有连通的联盟才能获得完全的效用，而忽略连通联盟的具体结构.1996年，Jackson和Wolinsky提出了“网络情形博弈”的模型，拓展了Myerson的图博弈模型.它是利用值函数代替原来的特征函数以体现不同网络结构对合作结果的影响.考虑超网络情形博弈，它是网络情形博弈的自然推广，由三元组（N，H，v）所组成，这里v是值函数，用于描述在超网络（N，H）合作结构下的合作收益.2012年，van den Nouweland和Slikker利用四个公理给出了位置值的公理化刻画.通过分支有效性和局部平衡超边贡献性两个公理，给出了超网络博弈中位置值的公理化刻画.作为推论，得到了网络博弈中位置值的新刻画.
In graph games, Myerson assumed that only connected coalitions achieve fully the worth, but the structures of coalitions are ignored. In 1996, Jackson and Wolinsky generalized the Myerson’s model to “network situation”. The characteristic function is replaced by the value function to reflect the influence of the structures on benefits of feasible coalitions. In this paper we consider hypernetwork situations, which is a natural extension on network situations. It consists of a triple (N, H, v) where (N, H) is a hypernetwork and v is the value function to describe the possible gains from TU-games, whose cooperation is restricted by a hypernetwork. In 2012, van den Nouweland and Slikker characterized the position value axiomatically for network situations by using four axioms. By introducing a new axiom, called partial balanced conference contributions, and combining component efficiency, we propose an axiomatic characterization of the position value for hypernetwork situations. As an immediate corollary, we give a new characterization of the position value for network situations.
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