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碳税政策下时变需求依赖库存与价格的供应链协调模型

张玉忠1  柏庆国1,*   

  1. 1. 曲阜师范大学管理学院、运筹学研究所, 山东日照 276826
  • 收稿日期:2017-04-17 出版日期:2017-06-15 发布日期:2017-06-15
  • 通讯作者: 柏庆国 E-mail: hustbaiqg@163.com
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金(Nos. 61340045,71371107), 山东省自然科学基金(No. ZR2015GZ009)

Supply chain coordination model with  time-varying demand depending on stock and selling price under carbon tax regulation

ZHANG Yuzhong BAI Qingguo1,*   

  1. 1. Institute of Operations Research, School of Management, Qufu Normal University, Rizhao 276826, Shandong,  China
  • Received:2017-04-17 Online:2017-06-15 Published:2017-06-15

摘要:

研究由一个供应商和一个零售组成的二级供应链系统在碳税政策下的协调问题. 对于市场需求率为时变函数且依赖于当前库存水平和销售价格的情形, 建立分散式和集中式供应链决策模型. 比较两种模型得出供应商和零售商合作能够提高供应链的整体利润但是也会产生更多的碳排放. 分别利用批发价格契约和两部收费契约协调分散式决策模型得出供应链协调的条件. 最后通过数值算例验证理论结果并分析碳税单价对供应链在两部收费契约下实现协调的影响.

关键词: 供应链协调, 斯坦伯格博弈, 碳税, 时变需求

Abstract:

This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain system consisting of one supplier and one retailer under carbon tax regulation. When the time-varying demand rate of retailer is dependent on stock level and selling price, the decentralized and centralized models are constructed and compared. The result shows that cooperation between supplier and retailer lead to higher profit and more carbon emissions. Wholesale price contract and two-part tariff contract are respectively used to coordinate the decentralized supply chain.  Several conditions that the supply chain can be coordinated by two-part tariff contract are also obtained.  Finally, several numerical examples are provided  to verify the theoretical results and impacts of carbon tax price on supply chain coordination under two-part tariff contract are analyzed.

Key words: supply chain coordination, Stackelberg game, carbon tax, time-varying demand