仁本博弈论:社会偏好理论综析

doi:10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2025.03.011

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 社会偏好理论泛化主流经济学的私人效用最大化设定,假设决策者还额外考虑其行为对他人境况的影响。基本模型中,决策目标函数为私人与他人效用的加权平均值。《仁本博弈论》采用此设定,将儒学中的“仁爱”对应为他人效用在决策者目标函数中所占权重,在超模博弈框架中证明:仁爱偏好(仁心)提升利他行为(德行),从而增益社会福利(义功)。此《仁本博弈论》可视作是针对孔子仁义之道思想的一种模型化尝试。本文系统地梳理了相关的行为博弈论文献,并与仁本论进行比较。我们发现,尽管前人已尝试在一般博弈情境下为社会偏好建模,但均衡分析和结论多数局限在具体博弈情境中,包括公共物品博弈、囚徒困境和独裁者博弈等等。因此,已有文献中虽有大量类似“仁生德义”的结论,但都是情境依赖的。仁本论在一定程度上统一了散落于各情境中的结论。

关键词: 仁本论, 社会偏好, 超模博弈, 儒家哲学, 利他行为, 社会福利

Abstract: Social preference theory generalizes the standard assumption of selfregarding utility maximization in economics, and allows decision-makers to take into account the effect of own behavior on others. In the basic model, the objective function is a weighted average of one’s own utility and that of others. "Confucian Game Theory" adopts this framework, associating an individual’s level of empathy-based benevolence with the weight assigned to others’ utility in their objective function. Within a supermodular game framework, they prove that benevolence (ren motive) enhances altruistic behavior (de behavior), which in turn improves overall social welfare (yi consequence). This "Confucian Game Theory" provides a behavioral scientific foundation for Confucian philosophy. This paper systematically reviews the related behavioral game theory literature and compares it with "Confucian Game Theory". We find that although earlier models of social preferences are formulated generally, the existing equilibrium analysis usually focuses on specific contexts such as public goods games, the prisoner’s dilemma, and dictator games. Consequently, while previous studies have derived many conclusions in the same vein as "ren improves de and yi", those results are often context-dependent. In a sense, Confucian Game Theory unifies conclusions that are scattered across myriad contexts.

Key words: residing in ren, social preferences, supermodular game, confucian philosophy, altruistic behavior, social welfare

中图分类号:

O225

俞宁, 庄尔覃, 曹志刚. 仁本博弈论:社会偏好理论综析[J]. 运筹学学报（中英文）, 2025, 29(3): 223-242.

YU Ning, ZHUANG Ertan, CAO Zhigang. Confucian game theory: A synthesis of social preference theory[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2025, 29(3): 223-242.

参考文献

[1] Phelps E S. Altruism, Morality, and Economic Theory [M]. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1975.
[2] Hicks J R. Mr keynes and the "classics"; a suggested interpretation [J]. Econometrica, 1937, 5(2): 147-159.
[3] McKenzie L. On equilibrium in graham’s model of world trade and other competitive systems [J]. Econometric, 1954, 22(2): 147-161.
[4] Arrow K J, Debreu G. Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy [J]. Econometric, 1954, 22(3): 265-290.
[5] Morishima M. Marx’s Economics: A Dual Theory of Value and Growth [M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
[6] Bergstrom T. Ethics, evolution, and games among neighbors [R]. UC Santa Barbara: Department of Economics, 2009.
[7] Hegel G W F. Lectures on the Philosophy of History [M]. London: George Bell & Sons, 1861.
[8] Weber M. The Religion of China, Confucianism and Taoism [M]. New York: Free Press, 1968.
[9] Jaspers K. The Origin and Goal of History (Routledge Revivals) [M]. London: Routledge, 2014.
[10] Becker G S. Altruism, egoism, and genetic fitness: Economics and sociobiology [J]. Journal of economic Literature, 1976, 14(3): 817-826.
[11] Rabin M. Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics [J]. The American Economic Review, 1993: 1281-1302.
[12] Andreoni J, Miller J. Giving according to GARP: An experimental test of the consistency of preferences for altruism [J]. Econometrica, 2002, 70(2): 737-753.
[13] Alger I. Public goods games, altruism, and evolution [J]. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2010, 12(4): 789-813.
[14] Bourlès R, Bramoullé Y, Perez-Richet E. Altruism in networks [J]. Econometrica, 2017, 85(2): 675-689.
[15] Alger I, Laslier J-F. Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: Coordination and information aggregation [J]. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2022, 34(2): 280-312.
[16] Hori H, Kanaya S. Utility functionals with nonpaternalistic intergenerational altruism [J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1989, 49(2): 241-265.
[17] Levine D K. Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments [J]. Review of Economic Dynamics, 1988, 1(3): 593-622.
[18] Li J, Deng X, Cheng Y, et al. Altruism, collectivism and egalitarianism: On a variety of prosocial behaviors in binary networked public goods games [C]//Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2023: 609-624.
[19] Fehr E, Schmidt K M. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999, 114(3): 817-868.
[20] Bolton G E, Ockenfels A. Erc: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition [J]. American Economic Review, 2000, 91(1): 166-193.
[21] Zhao K, Ferguson E, Smillie L D. Prosocial personality traits differentially predict egalitarianism, generosity, and reciprocity in economic games [J]. Frontiers in Psychology, 2016, 7: 1137.
[22] Dufwenberg M, Kirchsteiger G. A theory of sequential reciprocity [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 47(2): 268-298.
[23] Falk A, Fischbacher U. A theory of reciprocity [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 2006, 54(2): 293-315.
[24] 叶航, 汪丁丁. 作为内生偏好的利他行为及其经济学意义[J]. 经济研究, 2005, (8): 84-94.
[25] Alger I, Weibull J W. Kinship, incentives, and evolution [J]. American Economic Review, 2010, 100(4): 1725-1758.
[26] Bourlès R, Bramoullé Y, Perez-Richet E. Altruism and risk sharing in networks [J]. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2021, 19(3): 1488-1521.
[27] Yu S, Kempe D, Vorobeychik Y. Altruism design in networked public goods games [EB/OL]. [2025-04-23]. arXiv:210500505.
[28] Alger I. Evolutionarily stable preferences [J]. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B,
[29] Dong Y, Gavrilets S, Qin C-Z, et al. Kinship can hinder cooperation in heterogeneous populations [J]. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2024, 219: 231-243.
[30] Smith A. The Theory of Moral Sentiments [M]. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1759.
[31] 罗卫东. 情感·秩序·美德: 亚当·斯密的伦理学世界[M]. 北京:人民大学出版社, 2006.
[32] Fudenberg D, Tirole J. Game Theory [M]. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991.
[33] Osborne M J. A Course in Game Theory [M]. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994.
[34] Mas-Colell A, Whinston M D, Green J R, et al. Microeconomic Theory [M]. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
[35] Topkis D M. Supermodularity and Complementarity [M]. Princeton University Press, 1998.
[36] Ledyard J O. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research [M]. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
[37] Costa-Gomes M, Zauner K G. Ultimatum bargaining behavior in Israel, Japan, Slovenia, and the United States: A social utility analysis [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 2001, 34(2): 238-269.
[38] Alger I, Weibull J W. A generalization of Hamilton’s rule|love others how much? [J]. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2012, 299: 42-54.
[39] Charness G, Rabin M. Understanding social preferences with simple tests [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002, 117(3): 817-869.
[40] Carpenter J, Bowles S, Gintis H, et al. Strong reciprocity and team production: Theory and evidence [J]. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2009, 71(2): 221-232.
[41] Geanakoplos J, Pearce D, Stacchetti E. Psychological games and sequential rationality [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 1989, 1(1): 60-79.
[42] Alger I, Weibull J W. Homo moralis|preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching [J]. Econometrica, 2013, 81(6): 2269-2302.
[43] Bolton G E. A comparative model of bargaining: Theory and evidence [J]. The American Economic Review, 1991: 1096-1136.
[44] Alger I, Weibull J W, Lehmann L. Evolution of preferences in structured populations: Genes, guns, and culture [J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, 185: 104951
[45] Isaac R M, Walker J M. Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary contributions mechanism [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1988, 103(1): 179-199.
[46] McClintock C G. Social motivation|a set of propositions [J]. Behavioral Science, 1972, 17(5): 438-454.
[47] Griesinger D W, Livingston Jr J W. Toward a model of interpersonal motivation in experimental games [J]. Behavioral Science, 1973, 18(3): 173-188.
[48] Wyer R S. Prediction of behavior in two-person games [J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1969, 13(3): 222.
[49] von Neumann J, Morgenstern O. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior [M]. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944.
[50] Fisman R, Kariv S, Markovits D. Individual preferences for giving [J]. American Economic Review, 2007, 97(5): 1858-1876.
[51] Sobel J. Interdependent preferences and reciprocity [J]. Journal of Economic Literature, 2005, 43(2): 392-436.
[52] 陈叶烽, 叶航, 汪丁丁. 超越经济人的社会偏好理论:一个基于实验经济学的综述, 2011, (5): 63-100.
[53] 姜树广, 韦倩. 信念与心理博弈:理论、实证与应用[J]. 经济研究, 2013, 48(6): 141-154.
[54] Cooper D J, Kagel J H. Other-regarding preferences [J]. The Handbook of Experimental Economics, 2016, 2: 217.
[55] Fehr E, Charness G. Social preferences: Fundamental characteristics and economic consequences [J]. Journal of Economic Literature, 2025, 63(2): 440-514.
[56] Kohler S. Altruism and fairness in experimental decisions [J]. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2011, 80(1): 101-109.
[57] Gintis H. The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and The Unification of The Behavioral Sciences [M] Princeton university press, 2014
[58] Camerer C F. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction [M]. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011
[59] 黄少安, 张苏. 人类的合作及其演进研究[J]. 中国社会科学, 2013, (7): 77-89.
[60] Kagel J H, Roth A E. The Handbook of Experimental Economics [M]. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016.
[61] 包特, 王国成, 戴芸. 面向未来的实验经济学: 文献述评与前景展望[J]. 管理世界, 2020, 36(7): 218-237.
[62] Watabe M, Terai S, Hayashi N, et al. Cooperation in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma based on expectations of reciprocity [J]. The Japanese Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1996, 36(2): 183-196.
[63] Hayashi N, Ostrom E, Walker J, et al. Reciprocity, trust, and the sense of control: A crosssocietal study [J]. Rationality and Society, 1999, 11(1): 27-46.
[64] Kiyonari T, Tanida S, Yamagishi T. Social exchange and reciprocity: Confusion or a heuristic? [J]. Evolution and Human Behavior, 2000, 21(6): 411-427.
[65] Loewenstein G F, Thompson L, Bazerman M H. Social utility and decision making in interpersonal contexts [J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1989, 57(3): 426.
[66] Güth W, Schmittberger R, Schwarze B. An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining [J]. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1982, 3(4): 367-388.
[67] Güth W, Tietz R. Ultimatum bargaining behavior: A survey and comparison of experimental results [J]. Journal of Economic Psychology, 1990, 11(3): 417-449.
[68] Roth A E, Prasnikar V, Okuno-Fujiwara M, et al. Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An experimental study [J]. The American Eeconomic Review, 1991: 1068-1095.
[69] Blount S. When social outcomes aren’t fair: The effect of causal attributions on preferences [J]. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 1995, 63(2): 131-144.
[70] Cox J C. How to identify trust and reciprocity [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 46(2): 260-281.
[71] Charness G, Haruvy E. Altruism, equity, and reciprocity in a gift-exchange experiment: An encompassing approach [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, 40(2): 203-231.
[72] 陈叶烽. 亲社会性行为及其社会偏好的分解[J]. 经济研究, 2009, 44(12): 131-144.
[73] Slonim R, Roth A E. Learning in high stakes ultimatum games: An experiment in the slovak republic [J]. Econometrica, 1998: 569-596.
[74] 周业安, 左聪颖, 陈叶烽, 等.具有社会偏好个体的风险厌恶的实验研究[J]. 管理世界, 2012, (6): 86-95.
[75] Ohtsuki H. Evolutionary games in wright’s island model: Kin selection meets evolutionary game theory [J]. Evolution, 2010, 64(12): 3344-3353.
[76] Hwang S-H, Bowles S. Is altruism bad for cooperation? [J]. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2012, 83(3): 330-341.
[77] Alger I, Weibull J W. Strategic behavior of moralists and altruists [J]. Games, 2017, 8(3): 38.