基于最优让步均衡协调策略的供应链差价补偿机制研究

doi:10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2021.02.005

运筹学学报 ›› 2021, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (2): 67-80.doi: 10.15960/j.cnki.issn.1007-6093.2021.02.005

基于最优让步均衡协调策略的供应链差价补偿机制研究

蒋敏¹, 孟志青¹^,*(), 沈瑞²

1. 浙江工业大学管理学院, 杭州 320023
2. 浙江工业大学经济学院, 杭州 320023

收稿日期:2020-03-23 出版日期:2021-06-15 发布日期:2021-05-06
通讯作者: 孟志青 E-mail:mengzhiqing@zjut.edu.cn
作者简介:孟志青 E-mail: mengzhiqing@zjut.edu.cn
基金资助:
浙江省哲学社会科学规划项目(19NDJC215YB);国家自然科学基金(11871434)

Research on price difference compensation mechanism of supply chain based on optimal concession equilibrium coordination strategy

Min JIANG¹, Zhiqing MENG¹^,*(), Rui SHEN²

1. School of Management, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 320023, China
2. School of Economics, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 320023, China

Received:2020-03-23 Online:2021-06-15 Published:2021-05-06
Contact: Zhiqing MENG E-mail:mengzhiqing@zjut.edu.cn

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

制造商为了激励零售商订购更多数量的产品，会在产品零售价下调时提供给零售商一定的补偿，如何制定最优补偿机制是提高供应链收益的关键问题。为此，建立了两阶段销售差价补偿机制下制造商与零售商的博弈模型，分析了纳什均衡解和Stackelberg均衡解下制造商对零售商的差价补偿机制的决策行为，导出了在最优让步均衡策略下差价补偿机制定量关系，并提出了求解给定差价补偿系数下的近似最优让步均衡策略的算法。通过智能产品算例的分析，表明差价补偿机制能提高供应链的期望收益，增加零售商的订购量，进一步，说明差价补偿机制可以有效地改善零供关系。

关键词: 供应链契约, 最优让步均衡策略, 差价补偿机制, 智能产品, 博弈模型

Abstract:

In the supply chain, suppliers provide retailers with a compensation mechanism after the price of products is reduced, so as to encourage retailers to order more products. Therefore, we establish a price difference compensation mechanism model between manufacturer and retailer about a two stage sales. Firstly, we analyze results of the Nash equilibrium strategy and Stackelberg equilibrium strategy under the manufacturer to the retailer's price difference compensation mechanism of decision-making behavior. And then we obtain quantitative relationship of the price difference compensation mechanism under the optimal compromise equilibrium strategies. An algorithm of the approximate optimal compromise equilibrium strategy is proposed at a given price difference compensation coefficient. The case study of intelligent products shows that the mechanism of price difference compensation can improve the expected revenue of supply chain and increase the order quantity of retailers. It shows that the mechanism of price difference compensation can effectively improve relationships between suppliers and retailers.

Key words: supply chain contract, optimal concession equilibrium strategy, price difference compensation mechanism, intelligent product, game model

中图分类号:

O122.2

蒋敏, 孟志青, 沈瑞. 基于最优让步均衡协调策略的供应链差价补偿机制研究[J]. 运筹学学报, 2021, 25(2): 67-80.

Min JIANG, Zhiqing MENG, Rui SHEN. Research on price difference compensation mechanism of supply chain based on optimal concession equilibrium coordination strategy[J]. Operations Research Transactions, 2021, 25(2): 67-80.

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参考文献 23

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差价补偿系数	批发价	订购量	利润让步值	制造商利润	零售商利润
0.10	1 625.69	281.00	425 729.76	225 533.35	283 975.88
0.20	1 645.71	285.00	424 749.93	227 417.68	284 955.70
0.30	1 664.13	289.00	423 070.07	228 358.91	286 635.57
0.40	1 681.29	293.00	421 059.84	228 440.16	288 926.30
0.50	1 697.63	297.00	421 724.77	227 775.23	291 709.84
0.60	1 729.64	300.00	419 665.01	230 865.63	290 040.63
0.70	1 745.75	304.00	420 260.27	229 239.73	293 337.36
0.80	1 778.20	307.00	417 837.31	231 794.58	291 868.33
0.90	1 811.22	310.00	419 338.36	234 239.49	290 367.27
1.00	1 829.83	314.00	417 375.62	232 124.38	293 523.69

差价补偿系数	批发价	订购量	利润让步值	制造商利润	零售商利润
0.10	1 651.79	293.00	416 051.10	242 129.11	293 648.90
0.20	1 644.24	295.00	415 657.28	233 842.72	303 391.93
0.30	1 678.69	296.00	412 460.83	237 039.17	300 856.89
0.40	1 712.21	297.00	411 059.85	239 871.30	298 640.15
0.50	1 745.04	298.00	413 021.24	242 401.23	296 678.76
0.60	1 777.39	299.00	414 793.99	244 695.09	294 906.01
0.70	1 809.50	300.00	416 447.58	246 822.00	293 252.42
0.80	1 793.96	302.00	414 635.46	234 864.54	306 012.92
0.90	1 826.79	303.00	412 579.77	236 920.23	304 287.42
1.00	1 860.31	304.00	410 405.03	239 094.97	302 396.03

差价补偿系数	批发价	订购量	利润让步值	制造商利润	零售商利润
0.10	1 591.76	277.00	436 451.79	213 048.21	275 463.12
0.20	1 613.48	282.00	434 484.74	216 104.56	275 850.86
0.30	1 626.71	288.00	432 728.75	216 771.25	278 955.21
0.40	1 652.23	293.00	431 495.72	219 731.06	278 839.88
0.50	1 669.14	299.00	429 426.43	220 073.57	281 558.25
0.60	1 697.60	304.00	429 205.43	222 763.32	281 130.17
0.70	1 717.63	310.00	426 799.83	222 700.17	283 567.30
0.80	1 739.32	316.00	427 059.49	222 440.51	285 838.53
0.90	1 771.96	321.00	425 397.98	224 748.23	284 937.62
1.00	1 797.01	327.00	425 190.53	224 309.47	286 751.04

基于最优让步均衡协调策略的供应链差价补偿机制研究

Research on price difference compensation mechanism of supply chain based on optimal concession equilibrium coordination strategy

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