Owing to the problem of two-sided matching decision with uncertain preference ordinal (UPO), the existing methods mainly consider the overall payoff only. Yet the individual payoff and strategic operations during matching are often neglected in mutual choices. Based on the criteria of maximum satisfaction, a process for handling UPO is developed to derive payoff matrix. Then, a game-based matching model is built from the viewpoint of individual rational. This model takes account of both overall and individual payoff, which is combined with the idea of matrix game. Moreover, the results are proved to be Nash equilibrium. Finally, discussions on different strategic choices, as well as their advantages and limits analysis are presented.
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